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DEALER TERMINATIONS AND RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE: PARADOX
REVISITED
RICHARD E. DAY*
[I]n connection with the Sherman Act, it is delusive to treat
opinions written by different judges at different times as pieces
of a jig-saw puzzle which can be, by effort, fitted correctly into
a single pattern."1
In his famous critique, The Antitrust Paradox, then Profes-
sor Robert Bork noted that antitrust law is "law made primarily
by judges," 2 consisting of "a set of continually evolving theories
about the economics of industrial organization."3 When he pub-
lished his book in 1978, Professor Bork advocated a change in
direction in the Supreme Court's antitrust enforcement to reflect
"the progress of economic understanding. ' 4 According to Profes-
sor Bork, "Precedent is not ultimately controlling; economic ar-
gument is."
'5
As an adherent of the Chicago School of economics, Profes-
sor Bork argued that "[t]he only legitimate goal of American an-
titrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare."8 Consum-
ers benefit by increases in productive efficiency, made possible
by the integration of economic activities, which "always involves
the implicit elimination of actual or potential competition."
'7
Therefore, according to Professor Bork, we should encourage
such integration, including "those explicit and ancillary agreed-
upon eliminations of rivalry that make the basic integration
* John William Thurmond Chair Professor of Law, University of South Carolina
Law School. B.S., 1951, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1957, University of Michigan.
1. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
2. See R. BORi, THE ANTrRusT PARADox 10 (1978).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 36.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 51.
7. Id. at 28.
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more efficient."8
Specifically, Professor Bork viewed all vertical arrangements
between a supplier and its distributors, including resale price
maintenance, as restraints ancillary to vertical integration that
always should be lawful:
In a vertical case there is always economic integration between
the parties, the transaction of supplying and purchasing, so
that the main condition of the ancillarity test is satisfied ...
A manufacturer, for example, could always perform the retail-
ing function itself; therefore, nothing is lost if, instead, it re-
quires of independent retailers the maintenance of their resale
prices, or sales only within prescribed territories, or exclusive
dealing in the manufacturer's products.9
At the time he wrote his book, Professor Bork considered
the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.10 a "hopeful development"" in antitrust jurispru-
dence. The Sylvania Court overruled a previous decision holding
that vertical nonprice restraints, like resale price maintenance,
are per se illegal.12 Instead, it applied the rule of reason to up-
hold vertical territorial restraints. Ironically, Sylvania was writ-
ten by Justice Powell, whose resignation created the vacancy on
the Court for which Judge Bork was nominated. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet upheld explicit resale price mainte-
nance agreements, as advocated by Professor Bork, it has con-
tinued to draw much closer to his views since its about-face in
Sylvania.
The recent decision in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp."3 represents the Court's latest retreat from its
8. Id.
9. Id. at 29.
10. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 8, 419. Bork added:
The hopeful development in the current Supreme Court's approach to anti-
trust ... is a single case weighing in favor of a business practice its capacity to
create efficiency. That approach seems obvious, but against the background of
the jurisprudence of the last two decades it appears revolutionary. Applied
generally, it could save antitrust as useful and respectable policy. It is too soon
to tell whether the Court will follow up its new beginning.
Id. at 8.
12. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
13. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
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earlier per se illegal treatment of resale price maintenance by
any method except a simple unilateral refusal to deal. In 1968,
plaintiff Business Electronics Corporation (BEC) became the
first Houston retailer of electronic calculators manufactured by
defendant Sharp Electronics Corporation. Sharp appointed
Hartwell Office World as a second Houston retailer in 1972. Af-
ter complaining a number of times about BEG's price cutting
below Sharp's suggested resale prices, Hartwell gave Sharp an
ultimatum: he would terminate his dealership unless Sharp ter-
minated BEC within thirty days. Sharp agreed to Hartwell's de-
mand in July 1973. BEC filed suit, alleging a per se illegal con-
spiracy between Sharp and Hartwell to terminate BEC for the
purpose of eliminating price competition in the Houston calcula-
tor market. The jury found an "agreement or understanding"
between Sharp and Hartwell to terminate BEC because of its
price cutting. Under instructions by the trial court that such
agreement would be per se illegal, the jury awarded damages,
and the court entered judgment for $1.8 million in treble dam-
ages. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an agreement be-
tween a manufacturer and one of its dealers to terminate a sec-
ond dealer is not per se illegal as long as the surviving dealer
retains "complete freedom to set whatever price it chooses.' 4
On certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits15 "regarding the
proper dividing line between the rule that vertical price re-
straints are illegal per se and the rule that vertical nonprice re-
straints are to be judged under the rule of reason," 6 the Court
affirmed.
In defense of changing the categories of per se illegal re-
straints as circumstances change (including the make-up of the
Court) Justice Scalia observed that "[i]t would make no sense to
create out of the single term 'restraint of trade' a chronologically
14. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986),
ajf'd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
15. The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits had agreed with the Fifth Circuit
analysis. See McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d
1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988). The Third and Ninth Circuits had disagreed.
See Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983); Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
16. 108 S. Ct. at 1517.
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schizoid statute, in which a 'rule of reason' evolves with new cir-
cumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality re-
mains forever fixed where it was."1 7 Although Judge Bork did
not make it to the Supreme Court, at least some of his views on
the need for "a countertrend in the intellectual development of
the law"18 apparently have.
In the evolution to its present position, the Court has made
many distinctions in the nature, purpose, and effect of vertical
restraints. In two parallel lines of decision, the Supreme Court
has vacillated in establishing a standard of proof for determining
whether a supplier's refusal to deal with price-cutting dealers
amounts to a "contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy""9
within the meaning of the Sherman Act 0 and struggled with the
choice between application of per se illegal and rule-of-reason
standards to price and nonprice vertical restraints." The follow-
ing brief review of relevant antitrust issues and concepts, to-
gether with some of the leading vertical restraint decisions, is
offered to enable the reader to understand more fully the
Court's change in direction and what it may portend. Included
are some of the Court's relevant distinctions between horizontal
and vertical restraints, price and nonprice vertical restraints,
concerted and unilateral refusals to deal, and combinations and
express or implied contracts and conspiracies.
17. Id. at 1524.
18. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 419.
19. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which reads:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
20. Id. Compare Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) with
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
21. Compare Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988)
and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) with United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
[Vol. 40
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I. RULE OF REASON VS. PER SE ILLEGALITY
A. Horizontal and Vertical Refusals to Deal Compared
Concerted business activity traditionally is divided into two
categories: (1) horizontal restraints, which result from agree-
ments between competitors, and (2) vertical restraints, which re-
sult from agreements between suppliers and dealers. In a classic
horizontal concerted refusal to deal - known as a group boycott
or concerted boycott - some competitors agree not to deal with
one or more other competitors.22 Both the conspiracy and its im-
pact on competition are horizontal; they occur at the same level
of distribution of the product or service.
In contrast to the per se illegal treatment of horizontal con-
certed refusals to deal, vertical agreements by a supplier to deal
exclusively with a particular dealer, so-called "exclusive distrib-
utorships," generally have been upheld as reasonable "if compet-
itive products are readily available to others."23 This has been so
even when the supplier terminates one or more competitors of
the exclusive dealer.2 4
Some confusion has arisen in antitrust terminology because
in exclusive distributorship cases, the competitive impact is hor-
izontal - the elimination of the exclusive dealer's competitor or
competitors - while the agreement to refuse to deal is vertical
between the supplier and the exclusive dealer. Typically, two
vertical boycotts may be involved. One, known as a secondary
boycott, occurs when a dealer threatens to cease dealing with a
22. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); cf. Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985); Jef-
ferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980); E. A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consoli-
dated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109
(1973).
23. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967); see also GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 36
(1977); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). An illegal exclusive dealing or tying arrangement under sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982), may result when a customer agrees with
a supplier not to deal with supplier's competitors. Such agreements often take the form
of a sale or lease on condition that dealer not deal in goods of supplier's competitors.
See, e.g., McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959).
24. See, e.g., Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802 (6th
Cir. 1988).
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supplier unless it terminates or refuses to deal with one or more
competing dealers. The other occurs when a supplier terminates
or refuses to deal with one or more competing dealers. When an
agreement to terminate is found, it would be less confusing to
recognize such an arrangement as a vertical agreement having a
horizontal effect at the dealer level.
In practice, a combined vertical-horizontal agreement may
be found in two situations: (1) a combination of dealers bringing
concerted pressure on a distributor to terminate one or more
competing dealers or (2) a single dealer bringing unilateral pres-
sure on several suppliers to terminate one or more competing
dealers. An example of the first situation is found in United
States v. General Motors Corp.25 In that case the Supreme
Court held that a manufacturer's accession to numerous and col-
laborative demands from full-service automobile dealers to ter-
minate those dealers who sold to competing discount dealers was
per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. According to
the Court:
We do not decide whether ... General Motors could by
unilateral action [terminate the dealers] .... We have here a
classic conspiracy in restraint of trade: joint, collaborative ac-
tion by dealers, the [dealers' trade] associations, and General
Motors to eliminate a class of competitors by terminating busi-
ness dealings between them and a minority of Chevrolet deal-
ers and to deprive franchised dealers of their freedom to deal
through discounters if they so choose.2"
An example of the second situation is Klor's, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, Inc.2 7 In that case the Court held that the
plaintiff, a discount retailer of household appliances, had prop-
erly pleaded a vertical-horizontal conspiracy by alleging that a
group of suppliers had acquiesced in a single dealer's request to
cease dealing with the plaintiff on the same terms.
This is not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with
another, nor even of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to
an exclusive distributorship. Alleged in this complaint is a wide
combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a re-
25. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
26. Id. at 139-40.
27. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
[Vol. 40
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tailer. . . . It clearly has, by its "nature" and "character," a
"monopolistic tendency." As such it is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business
is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the
economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of
such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving
them out in large groups.
28
The Court addressed this terminological confusion between
horizontal and vertical restraints in Sharp. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, quoted with
apparent approval from the Third Circuit's opinion in Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.29 Stevens reasoned that if a sup-
plier terminates a dealer at the direction of a competing dealer,
"the restraint becomes primarily horizontal in nature in that one
customer is seeking to suppress its competition by utilizing the
power of a common supplier."30 From this premise he concluded
that "the two-party agreement involved in this case is more like
an illegal three-party agreement," such as the illegal per se hori-
zontal-vertical boycotts in Klor's and General Motors, than "a
legal independent decision."'31
Justice Scalia's majority opinion interpreted the dissent to
mean that the classification of a restraint depends upon the na-
ture of its anticompetitive effects, rather than upon its genesis
as a vertical or horizontal agreement.32 According to Justice
Scalia, if this were the proper antitrust test, "there would be no
such thing as an unlawful vertical restraint, since all anticompe-
titive effects are by definition horizontal effects."3 3 Therefore, he
concluded, "a restraint is horizontal not because it has horizon-
tal effects, but because it is the product of a horizontal
agreement.
'3 4
This debate over terminology obfuscates the real issue:
28. Id. at 212-13 (footnotes omitted).
29. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
30. 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1528 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cernuto, 595 F.2d at
168). Stevens also added, "Therefore, although the termination in such a situation is,
itself, a vertical restraint, the desired impact is horizontal and on the dealer, not the
manufacturer, level." Id. (quoting Cernuto, 595 F.2d at 168).
31. Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 1523 n.4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
1989]
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Should a vertical agreement having a horizontal competitive ef-
fect at the dealer level be per se illegal or judged under the rule
of reason? This issue remains: whether one characterizes the re-
straint as vertical or horizontal, or more precisely, as a vertical
agreement with a horizontal effect.
B. Vertical Price Fixing
Vertical price restraints between suppliers and dealers, like
horizontal price fixing among competitors, long have been con-
sidered per se illegalY' The doctrine traces its beginning to Jus-
tice Hughes' 1911 opinion in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons,3" which Professor Bork identified as "one decisive
misstep that has controlled a whole body of law."3 7 Actually, this
antitrust milestone was not an antitrust case. Dr. Miles, a manu-
facturer of proprietary medicines, sought to enforce its resale
price maintenance program by contracts with wholesalers and
retailers. The defendant wholesaler refused to enter into the re-
quired contract, and Dr. Miles sought to enjoin it from allegedly
procuring medicines for sale at cut prices by inducing others to
breach their contracts with Dr. Miles. The issue was the validity
of the restrictive agreements that Dr. Miles sought to enforce.
Justice Hughes, for the Court, affirmed the lower court's dismis-
sal "for want of equity.
38
The Dr. Miles Court cited three separate bases to support
its holding that resale price maintenance contracts are void and,
therefore, unenforceable: (1) the common law principle that "a
35. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Phillips v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). Fair
trade laws provided limited exemption for resale price maintenance agreements between
1937 and 1975. The Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937), repealed by
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801, amended
section 1 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), to exempt resale price maintenance contracts when permitted under
state fair trade laws. The McGuire Act, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952), repealed by Con-
sumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801, amended section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988)), to extend coverage of fair trade
protection to "non-signers." Congress repealed the fair trade exemption in 1975. See
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801.
36. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
37. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 32.
38. 220 U.S. at 383.
[Vol. 40
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general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid"; 9 (2) the
belief that a supplier, "having sold its product at prices satisfac-
tory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage may
be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic"; 40 and (3)
the belief that a series of such vertical restraints with competing
distributors had the same effect as horizontal price fixing agree-
ments among the distributors, which are per se illegal under the
Sherman Act, and, therefore, should be equally unenforceable at
common law.4'
Taken separately or together, these principles would sup-
port a rule of per se illegality against all vertical restraints of
trade. On the other hand, Justice Hughes also recognized the
common law ancillary restraint doctrine: a restraint may be legal
if reasonably necessary to effectuate "a sale of good will, or of an
interest in a business, or of the grant of a right to use a process
of manufacture. ' 42 With respect to such ancillary restraints, Jus-
tice Hughes noted:
To sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable
both with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is
limited to what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the
particular case, for the protection of the covenantee. Otherwise
restraints of trade are void as against public policy.
4'
Prior to Dr. Miles, the ancillary restraint doctrine was advo-
cated by Judge, later Chief Justice, Taft in United States v. Ad-
dyston Pipe & Steel Co. 44 As Judge Taft explained, a restraint
of trade would be lawful if it was "ancillary to the main purpose
of a [lawful] contract [and] was reasonably adapted and limited
to the necessary protection of a party in the carrying out of such
purpose."4 5 This common-law doctrine provides a general test
for all restraints with a practicable frame of reference: Is the re-
straint ancillary to a lawful main purpose? If so, is it reasonably
39. Id. at 404.
40. Id. at 409.
41. "As to this, the [supplier] can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts
than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeavored to es-
tablish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with
each other." Id. at 408.
42. Id. at 407.
43. Id. at 406.
44. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
45. 85 F. at 283.
3471989]
9
Day: Dealer Terminations and Resale Price Maintenance: Paradox Revisit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
necessary to effectuate the lawful main purpose? If a restraint is
nonancillary - a naked restraint of trade for the sole purpose of
eliminating competition - it has no justification or redeeming
virtue and, therefore, is per se unreasonable. If a restraint is an-
cillary, but goes further than what would be reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate the lawful main purpose, it would be an unrea-
sonable ancillary restraint.
Dr. Miles raised more questions than it answered. The
Court's strict application of a per se rule against all restraints on
alientation is inconsistent with its recognition of the applicabil-
ity of the ancillary restraint doctrine to other vertical restraints.
The major defect in the opinion is its lack of discussion about
when, if ever, a vertical restraint on resale prices might be a rea-
sonable ancillary restraint. If vertical price agreements never can
be categorized as reasonable ancillary restraints, the Dr. Miles
Court did not explain why. A broader question left open by Dr.
Miles is whether all vertical restraints are to receive the same
treatment, or if not, in what way vertical price restraints are to
be distinguished and treated differently from vertical nonprice
restraints.
Later in the same year, the Court made the rule of reason a
centerpiece of antitrust jurisprudence.," The Court stated that
all restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason, but recog-
nized that certain restraints may be per se unreasonable. Thus,
like the ancillary restraint doctrine, the rule of reason recognizes
two categories of restraints: (1) those that are per se unreasona-
ble and (2) those that are to be judged by balancing the procom-
petitive benefits against the anticompetitive effects. The rule of
reason might have been reconciled with the ancillary restraint
doctrine simply by defining the per se category as meaning
"nonancillary restraints" and judging the remaining ancillary re-
straints under the same rule-of-reason standard as the ancillary
restraint doctrine. The Court, however, ignored Judge Taft's
warning and "set sail on a sea of doubt"'7 to determine, case-by-
case, whether particular conduct should be classified as per se
illegal. The classic example of the problems created by this ap-
proach is the Court's vacillating treatment of vertical nonprice
46. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
47. 85 F. at 284.
[Vol. 40
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restraints.
C. Vertical Nonprice Restraints
Perhaps the most dramatic antitrust reversal following
changes in the Court's makeup is its treatment of vertical non-
price restraints.48 In its 1963 opinion in White Motor Co. v.
United States,9 the Court felt that it knew "too little of the
actual impact" of vertically imposed territorial and customer re-
strictions to categorize them as per se illegal. Just four years
later, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,5" the Court
applied the reasoning of Dr. Miles in holding that nonprice cus-
tomer and territorial restraints following the sale of a product
are per se illegal "restraints on alienation," while upholding sim-
ilar restraints on agents or consignees under the rule of reason.
The Court's decision in Schwinn was logically consistent
with all three theories expressed in Dr. Miles. In addition to the
asserted common-law proscription of restraints on alienation, re-
stricting a dealer's choice of customers and sales territory has
the same effect as similar restraints horizontally imposed. Inas-
much as the latter have been condemned as per se illegal market
division, so should the former under Dr. Miles. Finally, under
Dr. Miles, once the product is sold by the supplier, "the public
is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competi-
tion in the subsequent traffic." 2
48. Exclusive dealing and tying arrangements under section 3 of the Clayton Act
are beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of these practices, see Day, Exclu-
sive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 539 (1968).
49. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
50. See id. at 261. The Court added:
Horizontal territorial limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no
purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial limitation may or
may not have that purpose or effect. We do not know enough of the economic
and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They
may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against
aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for
breaking into or staying in business and within the 'rule of reason.' We need to
know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on com-
petition to decide whether they. . . should be classified as per se violations of
the Sherman Act.
Id. at 263.
51. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
52. 220 U.S at 409.
1989]
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Ten years after Schwinn, the Court again reversed itself in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,53 upholding non-
price vertical restraints under the rule of reason. 4 In the one
opinion Professor Bork had considered a "hopeful develop-
ment," Justice Powell, for the Court, used language suggestive of
the ancillary restraint doctrine. Powell emphasized the reasona-
ble need for the vertical customer and geographical restraints to
effectuate the lawful main purpose of promoting "interbrand
competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain effi-
ciencies in the distribution of his products."55 According to Jus-
tice Powell, "These 'redeeming virtues' are implicit in every de-
cision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason."56
The logical inconsistency with the rationale of Dr. Miles is again
paradoxical, and unless resale price maintenance can be distin-
guished from vertical nonprice restraints, it would appear that
Sylvania opened the door to eliminating Dr. Miles' per se illegal
treatment of resale price maintenance as well.
II. UNILATERAL VS. CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL
A. The Colgate Doctrine
Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies only to "contracts,
combinations . . . , and conspiracies";5 7 in short, it reaches only
concerted restraints of trade. Unilateral conduct is illegal only
under section 2 and only when it amounts to monopolization or
attempted monopolization. 8 In 1919, just eight years after Dr.
53. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
54. How could this turnabout have happened in so short a time? The simple an-
swer is that the decisions were not rendered by the same Court. The only two Justices
who participated in both Schwinn and Sylvania were Brennan and Stewart. Brennan
had voted with the majority in Schwinn and wrote the dissenting opinion when it was
reversed in Sylvania. Justice Stewart wrote the dissenting opinion in Schwinn and
joined the majority in reversing it in Sylvania. Justice White, the only other Justice on
the court for both decisions, did not participate in Schwinn and concurred with the ma-
jority in Sylvania that the restraint was not per se unreasonable, but would have distin-
guished, rather than overruled, Schwinn. Thus, the Court's reversal of position in Sylva-
nia did not result from a change of mind by any Justice, but rather from a change in the
membership on the Court.
55. 433 U.S. at 54.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 19.
58. A unilateral refusal to deal may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act if its
350 [Vol. 40
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Miles, the Court used this distinction in United States v. Col-
gate & Co.9 to uphold the right to select those with whom one
chooses to deal. As stated by Justice McReynolds:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly, the [Sherman] [A]ct does not restrict the long recog-
nized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discre-
tion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he
may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell. 0
Many. viewed Colgate as an end run around Dr. Miles' per
se ban on resale price maintenance e.6 The right to refuse to deal
purpose or effect is to create or maintain a monopoly. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (refusal to engage in joint marketing ar-
rangement with one or more competitors); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co. v. South-
ern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States,
258 U.S. 451 (1922) (refusal to deal with one or more customers or suppliers to foreclose
competition or gain a competitive advantage or destroy a competitor).
59. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
60. Id. at 307.
61. The belief that Colgate resurrected resale price maintenance is even more un-
derstandable from a reading of the Colgate indictment. The indictment specifically
charged Colgate with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by gaining adherence to its
resale price schedules in the following manner:
[Dlistribution among dealers of letters, telegrams, circulars and lists showing
uniform prices to be charged; urging them to adhere to such prices and notices,
stating that no sales would be made to those who did not; requests, often com-
plied with, for information concerning dealers who had departed from specified
prices; investigation and discovery of those not adhering thereto and placing
their names upon "suspended lists"; requests to offending dealers for assur-
ances and promises of future adherence to prices, which were often given; uni-
form refusals to sell to any who failed to give the same; sales to those who did;
similar assurancea and promises required of, and given by, other dealers fol-
lowed by sales to them; unrestricted sales to dealers with established accounts
who had observed specified prices, etc.
Id. at 303.
If the allegations in the indictment were true - and they must be assumed to be
true when, as in Colgate, defendant had demurred - it would be difficult to say that
Colgate had not combined and conspired to fix resale prices. Inexplicably, Justice Mc-
Reynolds stated the belief that the Court was bound to accept the district court's finding
that "the indictment does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its products to
dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at prices fixed
by the company." Id. at 307. There is an ironic historical footnote to the case. Justice
Hughes, the author of the Court's opinion in Dr. Miles, represented Colgate. He had
resigned from the Court to run for president of the United States in 1916 and did not
13
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appears innocuous on its face. When, however, that right is cou-
pled with the right to "announce in advance the circumstances
under which he will refuse to sell," 2 the distinction between
unilateral action and agreement becomes blurred. The distinc-
tion may be unimportant when, as in Dr. Miles, the only issue is
whether the court may enforce an agreement to fix resale prices.
Yet the matter is quite different when the issue is whether the
conduct violates the Sherman Act, as in Colgate, and gives rise
to possible treble damages, injunctive relief, and even criminal
penalties. Basic contract law recognizes that a unilateral con-
tract may arise when the terms of an offer are announced in ad-
vance and another accepts by engaging in conduct in reliance on
the preannounced conditions. One might question what differ-
ence it makes whether such conduct is characterized as unilat-
eral or contractual if such a contract is void and unenforceable
under Dr. Miles. The answer must lie in the notion that when
such an agreement exists, it may be expected that the parties
will carry out their bargain even though it would not be specifi-
cally enforceable. On the other hand, if that is the rationale for
finding a Sherman Act violation when there is a bilateral agree-
ment and no violation when the refusal to deal is unilateral, it
would appear to be a distinction without a difference. The threat
of termination would be the most effective means to keep price
cutters in line whether there was a legally unenforceable agree-
ment or merely a unilateral refusal to deal based on a prean-
nounced policy.
B. Combinations and Implied Conspiracies
Orthodox antitrust thinking treats the Sherman Act's allit-
erative "contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy" as jurisdic-
tional equivalents - each requiring proof of an agreement of
two or more parties acting in concert. It was the absence of any
claim of agreement that led the Court to uphold the dismissal in
Colgate. Colgate did not, however, open the door to the imple-
mentation of resale price maintenance programs through prean-
nounced policies of refusals to deal with price cutters. The Court
prevented that result by relaxing the standard for proving a
return until 1930 when President Hoover appointed him Chief Justice.
62. 250 U.S. at 307.
[Vol. 40
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combination or conspiracy under section 1. This was accom-
plished through the development of two separate, but comple-
mentary, concepts: the implied conspiracy doctrine and combi-
nation without agreement."3 The possibility of finding a
combination without an express or implied agreement first was
suggested by language in the Court's 1922 decision in FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co.64 The defendant manufacturer was held
to have "secure[d] the cooperation of its distributors and cus-
tomers" 5 in its resale price maintenance program by methods
"which [were] quite as effectual as agreements express or im-
plied intended to accomplish the same purpose.""8 In its 1960
landmark decision in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co."7 the
Court reviewed Beech-Nut and other intervening decisions erod-
ing the Colgate doctrine and concluded that "an unlawful com-
bination is not just such as arises from a price maintenance
agreement, express or implied."6 8 According to the Court, an un-
lawful combination also arises "if the producer secures adher-
ence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere
declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his an-
nounced policy.
869
What is required to establish an illegal combination, with-
out any express or implied agreement? In Parke, Davis Justice
Brennan's majority opinion recognized the application of the
Colgate doctrine in the preannounced policy of refusing to deal
with price cutters. The Court concluded, however, that Parke,
Davis went too far in its preannounced policy of refusing to deal
with any wholesaler who dealt with price-cutting retailers. Ac-
63. See Day, New Theories of Agreement and Combination, 42 ANTITRUST L. J. 287
(1973).
64. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
65. Id. at 455.
66. Id. According to the Court:
[Ilt is settled that in prosecutions under the Sherman Act a trader is not guilty
of violating its terms who simply refuses to sell to others, and he may withhold
his goods from those who will not sell them at the prices which he fixes for
their resale. He may not, consistently with the [Sherman] [Aict, go beyond the
exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations, express or implied,
unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the chan-
nels of interstate trade.
Id. at 452-53.
67. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
68. Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
69. Id.
1989] 353
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cording to Justice Brennan, Parke, Davis had created a combi-
nation with wholesalers and retailers by enlisting the aid of
wholesalers to keep its products from price-cutting retailers,
"thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its suggested retail
prices."
70
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan was joined by Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Whittaker in the view that "[s]crutiny of
the [majority] opinion will reveal that the Court has done no
less than send to its demise the Colgate doctrine which has been
a basic part of antitrust law concepts since it was first an-
nounced in 1919."'7" As Justice Harlan later acknowledged, how-
ever, this was not the end of the Colgate doctrine.
Under the implied conspiracy doctrine, a conspiracy may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. As Justice Stone stated in
Interstate Circuit v. United States,7 2 "It is elementary that an
unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without simul-
taneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators."
7 3
The Court's reliance on evidence of consciously parallel conduct
suggested to some that a conspiracy - like that found in a
Parke, Davis combination - could be inferred from circumstan-
tial evidence of consciously parallel behavior alone, without
proof of an agreement. Justice Stone, however, merely applied
commonly accepted rules of evidence and unilateral contract law
when he announced that "[aicceptance by competitors, without
previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the
necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of in-
terstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspir-
acy under the Sherman Act."74 As Justice Clark subsequently
explained in Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distribut-
ing Corp.,7 5 "The crucial question is whether [distributors' re-
fusals to deal with plaintiff theater] stemmed from independent
decision or from an agreement, tacit or express."7 6 While recog-
nizing that behavior may be admissible circumstantial evidence
of an agreement, Justice Clark emphasized that "this Court has
70. Id. at 45.
71. Id. at 49.
72. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
73. Id. at 227.
74. Id.
75. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
76. Id. at 540.
354 [Vol. 40
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never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively
establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior
itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense."
77
The difficulty presented by the application of the implied
conspiracy doctrine to a refusal to deal is in distinguishing be-
tween acceptance, "without previous agreement of an invitation
to participate" 8 in an unlawful plan, such as resale price main-
tenance and unilateral acquiesence in the same plan announced
"in advance" ' as a condition for dealing. For example, what if a
distributor terminates a discounting dealer following complaints
from one or more competing dealers? Inevitably, the proper ap-
plication and reconciliation of these two doctrines led to a con-
flict in the circuit courts.80
77. Id. at 541. Clark also added, "Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel
behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward con-
spiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely." Id. (footnote omitted).
78. See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 227.
79. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
80. Some circuits took the view that evidence of termination following competitor
complaints was sufficient to create a jury issue of conspiracy. See, e.g., Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting standard set forth by
Seventh Circuit, nevertheless finding evidence sufficient to support jury's finding of con-
spiracy), afl'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.
1963). Others apparently required evidence of "something more" than merely termina-
tion following competitor complaints, most commonly a causal relationship between the
complaints and the termination. See, e.g., Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 709 F.2d
1257 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Bostick Oil Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); Battle v.
Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on reh'g by an equally divided court
sub nom. Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 931 (1984); Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981); Edward J. Swee-
ney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
Dr. Miles' rationale, condemning the horizontal impact of a series of vertical resale price
maintenance agreements between a supplier and competing dealers, was extended by the
Third Circuit in Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979), to
condemn a manufacturer's termination of a discounting distributor at the insistence of a
single competing distributor:
[I]f the action of a manufacturer or other supplier is taken at the direction of
its customer, the restraint becomes primarily horizontal in nature in that one
customer is seeking to suppress its competition by utilizing the power of a
common supplier. Therefore, although the termination in such a situation is,
itself, a vertical restraint, the desired impact is horizontal and on the dealer,
not the manufacturer, level.
Id. at 168.
By contrast, some circuits intimated that even a showing of causation might be in-
sufficient to permit a jury to infer the requisite vertical conspiracy between the supplier
17
Day: Dealer Terminations and Resale Price Maintenance: Paradox Revisit
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw
In dealer termination cases, the Supreme Court has not al-
ways made clear whether it was applying an expanded theory of
combination without requiring an agreement or merely was in-
ferring a conspiracy from circumstantial evidence under the im-
plied conspiracy doctrine. In Albrecht v. Herald Co.8' the Court
found an illegal combination between the defendant newspaper
publisher and its agents. In an effort to enforce its maximum
resale price policy, the publisher hired the agents on a tempo-
rary basis to solicit sales and deliver papers to the plaintiff car-
rier's customers. Many antitrust lawyers were surprised that the
Court concluded that agents acting on behalf of a principal
should be treated differently from employees for purposes of
finding a combination or conspiracy between the corporation
and third parties. But even more controversy was generated over
a footnote in which Justice White, writing for the majority, gra-
tuitously suggested three additional theories for finding a combi-
nation or conspiracy.
Justice White's first theory suggested the possibility of "a
combination between [defendant and plaintiff], at least as of the
day [plaintiff] unwillingly complied with [defendant's] adver-
tised price."82 Paradoxically, under this theory, violation hinges
on the plaintiff's compliance with defendant's suggested resale
prices, while injury is based on plaintiff's termination for failure
to comply.8 3 In addition, the anomalous result of this theory is
and the complaining dealer. See, e.g., Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hoster, Inc., 688 F.2d 853
(1st Cir. 1982); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on
reh'g by an equally divided court, 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 926 (1984). Other circuits failed to state what standard they were applying. See,
e.g., Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1007
(1982); H. L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
81. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See also International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western
Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); cf. William
Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
82. 390 U.S. at 150 n.6. See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), overruled in part on other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (leaving undisturbed Perma Life holdings
rejecting in pari delicto defense); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980);
Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918
(1980); R & G Affiliates, Inc. v. Knoll Int'l, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1395 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. As noted by Justice Harlan in his dissent, "It is not the the momentary acqui-
escence but the punishment for refusing to acquiesce that does the damage on which
recovery is based." 390 U.S. at 162. According to Justice Harlan, this causation paradox
356 [Vol. 40
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that it makes the guilt or innocence of a supplier depend upon
the state of mind of the terminated dealer. A combination exists
if the plaintiff complied willingly, but not if he complied unwill-
ingly. In truth, the plaintiff may comply "willingly" in order to
lay the basis for an antitrust treble-damage claim should he
later be terminated for ceasing to comply.
A similar problem was raised in Justice Brennan's earlier
decision in Parke, Davis. In that case, the Court held that an
illegal combination resulted when dealers conformed with a sup-
plier's preannounced resale price policy "to avoid ... price
competition,"84 but not when the dealer followed the supplier's
resale price policy through "free choice prompted alone by the
desirability of the product." '85 In both instances the dealer is in-
duced, or coerced, to comply with its supplier's preannounced
policy to avoid termination or to continue receiving the sup-
plier's product.
Such attempted distinctions in the dealer's subjective moti-
vations for complying with a distributor's preannounced policy
creates both proof and compliance problems. Looking to the
resulted from the majority's "unwillingness to face the ultimate conclusion at which it
has actually arrived": the coercion of compliance is unlawful. Id. As Justice Harlan con-
cluded, however, "The reason for the Court's reluctance to state this conclusion bluntly
is transparent: this statement of the matter takes no account of the absence of a combi-
nation or conspiracy." Id. See Greenberg, Unilateral Refusals to Deal, 42 ANTITRUST L.J.
305, 311-12 (1973) ("[N]o amount of talk about anticompetitive 'purposes' or 'effects' can
furnish the jurisdictional prerequisite of contract, combination or conspiracy in the chal-
lenged act, namely, the refusal to deal.") (emphasis in original); see also Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) overruled in part on
other grounds, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
(leaving undisturbed Perma Life holdings rejecting in pari delicto defense).
84. 362 U.S. at 47.
85. Id. The Court added:
It must be admitted that a seller's announcement that he will not deal with
customers who do not observe his policy may tend to engender confidence in
each customer that if he complies his competitors will also. But if a manufac-
turer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to bring about general vol-
untary acquiescence which has the collateral effect of eliminating price compe-
tition, and takes affirmative action to achieve uniform adherence by inducing
each customer to adhere to avoid such price competition, the customers' acqui-
escence is not then a matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the
desirability of the product. The product then comes packaged in a competi-
tion-free wrapping - a valuable feature in itself - by virtue of concerted ac-
tion induced by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is thus the organizer of a
price-maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 46-47.
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supplier's actions does not solve the problem. In fact, that ap-
proach raises several questions as well. May a supplier avoid lia-
bility by making clear in its preannounced policy that, although
it will refuse to deal with anyone not following its resale price
policy, it does not wish to coerce anyone to comply unwillingly?
Would the supplier be absolved by sworn statements from com-
plying dealers to the effect that they complied willingly, without
any coercion, and only because of the desirability of the prod-
uct? Might not the desirability of the product alone be coercive?
Would not willing compliance amount to unlawful agreement?
The second theory for inferring a conspiracy suggested by
the Albrecht footnote was a combination between the supplier
and its other dealers "because the firmly enforced price policy
applied to all [dealers], most of whom acquiesced in it." 6 Again,
the effect of such a standard would be to make liability depend
upon the subjective motivation of the dealers, rather than the
supplier. The qualifier that the price policy be firmly enforced is
of little assistance. This raises more questions: Does a prean-
nounced policy of refusing to deal amount to firm enforcement?
Does the carrying out of that policy by terminating a price cut-
ter amount to firm enforcement? Must the supplier terminate
more than one price cutter or all price cutters to meet the firm
enforcement criterion? Must a supplier make it clear that it re-
ally does not mean what it says when it announces a policy of
refusing to sell to price cutters? Is the Colgate doctrine to be
limited to initial customer selection only?
The Albrecht footnote's third theory suggests that the sup-
plier combined with customers who switched to the supplier in
order to receive the supplier's lower price offer.s7 This theory
represents the ultimate attempt to bring a supplier's unilateral
efforts to maintain maximum prices within section I of the Sher-
man Act. Consumers would be surprised to learn that their own
self-interest in securing the lowest possible price might make
them participants in an illegal price-fixing combination or
conspiracy. 8
86. 390 U.S. at 150 n.6. See also Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., 729 F.2d 676
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1980).
87. See 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
88. The coincidence of the publisher's and consumers' interests in maintaining a
[Vol. 40
20
Submission to South Carolina Law Review
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
TERMINATIONS AND PRICE MAINTENANCE
In view of these far-reaching theories of combination and
implied conspiracy, it is no wonder that conflict arose in the cir-
cuits over the probative significance of dealer terminations, es-
pecially when the termination followed, or was in response to, a
complaint from one or more competing dealers.
III. A CONVERGENCE AND RECONCILIATION
The conflict among the circuits was addressed, if not re-
solved, in the Court's 1984 decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp.8 9 Ironically, as in Sylvania, Justice Powell
wrote the opinion in substantial conformity with Professor
Bork's views. In deciding whether proof of agreement, express or
implied, is required by section 1 of the Sherman Act, Justice
Powell made no mention of the questionable Parke, Davis dis-
tinction between combination, which it suggested does not re-
quire agreement, and conspiracy, which clearly does. Instead, he
reached back to the holding in American Tobacco Co. v. United
States9" that "[c]ircumstances must reveal 'a unity of purpose or
a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in
an unlawful arrangement.' , Ignoring the far-reaching implied
conspiracy and combination theories of Albrecht and its prog-
eny, Justice Powell emphasized the need to prove a requested
and communicated "acquiescence or agreement" to fix prices.22
Justice Powell emphasized the continued vitality of the Col-
gate doctrine, distinguishing between unilateral and concerted
refusals to deal.9 3 He then referred to "the second important dis-
lower "maximum" price in Albrecht would present a classic example of the Bork theory
that such vertical price fixing should be upheld on consumer welfare grounds. See R.
BORK, supra note 2, at 281, 439.
89. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
90. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
91. 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 810).
92. See id. at 764 n.9. Justice Powell added:
The concept of "a meeting of the minds" or "a common scheme" in a distribu-
tor-termination case includes more than a showing that the distributor con-
formed to the suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be
presented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agree-
ment, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.
Id.
93. Powell stated:
This Court has drawn two important distinctions that are at the center of this
and any other distributor-termination case. First, there is the basic distinction
1989] 359
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tinction in distributor-termination cases" as being "between
concerted action to set prices and concerted action on nonprice
restrictions." 4 While concerted price fixing has been per se ille-
gal since Dr. Miles, under Sylvania nonprice vertical restraints
are judged under the rule of reason, "which requires a weighing
of the relevant circumstances of a case to decide whether a re-
strictive practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint on com-
petition." 9 Justice Powell concluded that the preservation of
both the Colgate and Sylvania doctrines required that the stan-
dard of proof for inferring a concerted refusal to deal will vary
according to whether the alleged vertical restraint is per se ille-
gal price fixing or a nonprice vertical restraint to be judged by
the rule of reason. 8 According to Justice Powell, permitting an
inference of a price-fixing conspiracy merely from dealer termi-
nations following, or in response to, dealer complaints "would
create an irrational dislocation in the market. '9 7 Therefore,
between concerted and independent action - a distinction not always clearly
drawn by parties and courts. . . . Under Colgate, the manufacturer can an-
nounce its resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to
comply. And a distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's demand in
order to avoid termination.
Id. at 760-61.
94. Id. at 761. Justice Powell also added:
The second important distinction in distributor-termination cases is that be-
tween concerted action to set prices and concerted action on nonprice restric-
tions. The former have been per se illegal since the early years of national
antitrust enforcement .... The latter are judged under the rule of reason,
which requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances of a case to decide
whether a restrictive practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint on
competition.
Id. (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 763. The Court added:
[I]t is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufac-
turer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from
price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to per se
treatment and treble damages. On a claim of concerted price fixing, the anti-
trust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proving
that there was such an agreement. If an inference of such an agreement may be
drawn from highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the
doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded.
Id.
97. Id. at 764. The Court also stated:
Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of com-
plaints [from other distributors], or even from the fact that termination came
about "in response to" complaints, could deter or penalize perfectly legitimate
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"something more" is needed than dealer complaints.98 What is
that "something more"? As stated by Justice Powell, "There
must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting inde-
pendently."9 Specifically, he was concerned that "courts should
not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences
are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often to
deter procompetitive conduct."' 00
Unsurprisingly, the interpretation and application of Mon-
santo has not been uniform in the lower courts. The decided
trend, however, has been to dismiss cases having disputed evi-
dence of the reasons for termination. When defendants have as-
serted "plausible" nonprice motives, the per se claim has been
taken from the jury.
The Fourth Circuit has applied Monsanto in several cases.
In Terry's Floor Fashions v. Burlington Industries"'0 the court
held that under Monsanto, termination of a distributor "follow-
ing, or even in response to, complaints by other distributors is
conduct. . . . To bar a manufacturer from acting solely because the informa-
tion upon which it acts originated as a price complaint would create an irra-
tional dislocation in the market.
Id. at 763-64.
98. See id. at 764.
99. Id. The majority also stated, "[T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others
'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful ob-
jective.'" Id. The Court further stated that this "common scheme," at least in distribu-
tor-termination cases, "includes more than a showing that the distributor conformed to
the suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that the
distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought by the
manufacturer." Id. at 764 n.9. The Court ultimately affirmed the jury verdict that the
plaintiff distributor was terminated pursuant to a resale price maintenance conspiracy
between Monsanto and its distributors on the basis of "substantial direct evidence of
agreements to maintain prices." Id. at 765 (emphasis in original).
More recently, in its 1986 decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), the Court held that "[t]o survive a motion for summary judg-
ment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must
present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators ac-
ted independently." Id. at 588.
The Court apparently is wary of "permit[ting] factfinders to infer conspiracies when
such inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter
procompetitive conduct." Id. at 593.
100. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593(1986) (cit-
ing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762-64).
101. 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985).
23
Day: Dealer Terminations and Resale Price Maintenance: Paradox Revisit
Published by Scholar Commons,
362 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
not sufficient evidence from which to infer a conspiracy." 102 In
Garment District v. Belk Stores Services10 3 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant manufacturer on
the ground that it acted unilaterally in terminating the plaintiff
price-cutting dealer, despite finding that the plaintiff dealer had
been terminated because of coercive acts of a full-price dealer
and that the defendant's assertions about its distribution policy
were "pretextual." In National Marine Electronic Distributors,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co.104 the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
attempt to avoid Monsanto by arguing that its proof of termina-
tion following price complaints from other dealers was sufficient
for the jury to find a concerted horizontal restraint of price com-
petition. According to the Court, "The issues in these cases are
similar, and the same principles govern. . . . [W]hether one
chooses to allege that the restraint is vertical or horizontal, the
lack of a conspiracy to restrain prices leads to the same
result."' 05
Other circuits also have virtually eliminated the implied
conspiracy doctrine as a jury question in vertical price fixing
cases when there is disputed evidence of motivation for dealer
terminations. 10 One critic of this post-Monsanto trend argues
102. Id. at 615. As noted by Judge Sneeden, prior to Monsanto the Fourth Circuit
"had held that evidence showing that a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting distrib-
utor following complaints by competing distributors was sufficient evidence from which
to infer a conspiracy." Id. at 611 n.12. See also Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983).
Chief Judge Winter concurred specially. He felt that the evidence would support a
jury finding of concerted action, but concluded that even if the jury found a conspiracy
to refuse to deal, it was to preserve nonprice territorial restrictions, which "is conduct
judged under the rule of reason." 763 F.2d at 617. Applying the Sylvania distinction
between horizontal interbrand restraints and vertical intrabrand restraints, Chief Judge
Winter noted that vertical nonprice restraints "may limit intra brand competition, but
at the same time promote inter brand competition 'by allowing a manufacturer to
achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of its products.'" Id. at 618 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1978) (en
banc)). Chief Judge Winter also distinguished vertical price from nonprice restraints on
the ground that resale price maintenance "may inhibit inter brand competition by facili-
tating interbrand price collusion and conscious parallelism." Id. at 618 n.5 (citation omit-
ted) (emphasis in original).
103. 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728 (1988).
104. 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 193.
106. Following Monsanto, lower courts have granted summary judgments or di-
rected verdicts to defendants in several cases requiring "something more" to prove con-
certed action than termination in response to a price complaint. See, e.g., Garment Dist.,
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that even under Monsanto and Sharp, "plaintiffs should still
have the opportunity to persuade the jury that keeping prices 'at
some level' was a necessary part of a quid pro quo that permit-
ted the manufacturer and its high priced retailers to continue
doing business with each other." 107 Such criticism points up the
paradox in vertical price and nonprice cases. To reopen the door
to an expanded implied conspiracy doctrine carries the risk that
allowing "implausible" inferences of vertical price fixing conspir-
acies might "deter procompetitive conduct." The obvious solu-
tion to the paradox would be to judge all vertical restraints,
price as well as nonprice, under the rule of reason. If this were
done, an expanded implied conspiracy doctrine could safely be
reinstated since proof of an agreement, or "conspiracy," would
Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1728
(1988); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); Burlington Coat
Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Espirit de Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1985); Car Carriers,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985);
Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1160(1985); Magid Mfg. Co. v. U.S.D. Corp., 654 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill.
1987); Reborn Enters. v. Fine Child, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1423 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) aff'd 754
F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d
133 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984) (citing the pre-Monsanto decision in
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979)).
The Ninth and Second Circuits have held that under Monsanto, proof of a legiti-
mate reason for termination will justify summary judgment or a directed verdict against
a terminated dealer unless the plaintiff comes forward with "strongly persuasive" evi-
dence of conspiracy running counter to the alleged conspirators' economic self-interest.
See O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Landmark Dev.
Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1985)(per curiam); accord Burlington
Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit de Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
afl'd, 769 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1985).
The Fifth Circuit has likened a termination of a discounting dealer at the request of
a full price dealer to an "exclusive dealership," amounting to no more than a "distribu-
tional restraint" in the sense that the surviving dealer is free to set whatever price it
chooses. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988); see also National Marine Elecs. Dist. v. Raytheon Co., 778
F.2d 190, 194 (4th Cir. 1985). Contra Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769
F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1985); Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir.
1979) (decided prior to Monsanto).
The Eighth Circuit even overturned a jury verdict finding defendant manufacturer
guilty of terminating a discount distributor pursuant to an understanding with a full-
price retailer, on the ground that the evidence merely proved a vertical conspiracy, not a
price fixing conspiracy, and that since the conspiracy had both price and non-price ele-
ments, it could not be analyzed under the per se rule applicable only to price restraints.
See McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chain Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986).
107. McArthur, The Terminated Distributor and Vertical Price-Fixing: What's
Left After Sharp, ANTITRUST, Fall 1988, at 10, 12.
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no longer be the determinative issue of legality, and reasonably
ancillary "procompetitive conduct" would not be deterred. In
addition to the usual arguments against vertical price fixing
agreements, critics of the post-Monsanto trend no doubt would
oppose this solution for the reason that it would eliminate the
most effective weapon agianst dealer terminations.
IV. RULE OF REASON EXTENDED - AGREEMENT TO TERMINATE
DISCOUNTER WITHOUT RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT
As noted above, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp.0 8 the Supreme Court held that an agreement
between a supplier and one of its dealers to terminate a price-
cutting dealer was not illegal per se, absent a resale price main-
tenance agreement with the surviving dealer. Justice Scalia, for
the 6-2 majority, reaffirmed the rule of reason as the basic stan-
dard for all restraints of trade, limiting the application of the
per se illegal standard to conduct that is "'manifestly anticom-
petitive,' that is, conduct 'that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.' """o
While recognizing that resale price maintenance agreements
have been illegal per se since Dr. Miles, Justice Scalia also em-
phasized that "the scope of per se illegality should be narrow in
the context of vertical restraints."" 0 Citing Monsanto, he noted
that the Court had been "solicitous to assure that the market-
freeing effect of. . .Sylvania is not frustrated by related legal
rules,""' concluding:
Our approach to the question presented in the present
case is guided by the premises of GTE Sylvania and Mon-
santo: that there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason
standard; that departure from that standard must be justified
by demonstrable economic effect, such as the facilitation of
cartelizing, rather than formalistic distinctions; that interbrand
competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws; and
108. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
109. Id. at 1519 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
50 (1977), and Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979))).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1520.
[Vol. 40
26
Submission to South Carolina Law Review
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
TERMINATIONS AND PRICE MAINTENANCE
that rules in this area should be formulated with a view to-
wards protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania.1 '2
In addition to the Dr. Miles theory that vertical resale price
maintenance agreements may have the same purpose and effect
as horizontal price fixing at the dealer level, some commentators
have argued that it also facilitates horizontal price fixing at the
manufacturers' level.113 Because dealers could not pass on lower
prices to consumers, the argument goes, there would be little in-
centive to cheat on a manufacturer's cartel. Sylvania noted ar-
guments that vertical price restraints, unlike vertical nonprice
restraints, may reduce both interbrand and intrabrand price
competition because they "facilitate cartelizing."' 14 Absent an
agreement on prices, however, Justice Scalia could see no more
assistance to cartelizing in a vertical agreement to terminate a
price-cutting dealer than the "minimal assistance" provided by
the exclusive territorial agreements upheld in Sylvania."6 Ob-
serving that "[c]artels are neither easy to form nor easy to main-
tain,"116 he concluded that, absent a price fixing agreement with
the surviving dealer, "the manufacturer both retains its incen-
tive to cheat on any manufacturer-level cartel (since lower prices
can still be passed on to consumers) and cannot as easily be used
to organize and hold together a retailer-level cartel.
'117
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the sole function
of the agreement to terminate BEC was to eliminate price com-
petition and resulted from the surviving dealer's coercion of
Sharp. He concluded, therefore, that "the conflict with antitrust
policy is manifest."' 18 Commenting on what he viewed as the
dissent's "principal fear" of coercion by Hartwell through asser-
tion of "dominant retail power,"'" 9 Justice Scalia stated that this
would not justify a per se rule. According to Scalia, such power
at the retail level is "rare, because of the usual presence of inter-
112. Id. at 1520-21.
113. See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975).
114. 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (quoting Posner, supra note 113, at 294).
115. See 108 S. Ct. at 1521.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1521 n.2.
1989] 365
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brand competition and other dealers, and it should therefore not
be assumed but rather must be proved.
120
On the issue of motivation, Justice Scalia feared the trial
court's per se rule "would threaten to dismantle" the Sylvania
doctrine.121 Quoting from Monsanto, he recognized that legiti-
mate motives may justify a manufacturer's refusal to deal with
price cutters, specifically "to ensure that its distributors earn
sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training
additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of
the product, and . . to see that 'free-riders' do not inter-
fere. '122 Recognizing the difficulty of proving motivation, he
noted that "all vertical restraints, including the exclusive terri-
tory agreement held not to be per se illegal in GTE Sylvania,
have the potential to allow dealers to increase 'prices' and can be
characterized as intended to achieve just that. ' 123 Thus, fear of
prosecution and inability to prove motivation might lead manu-
facturers "to forgo legitimate and competitively useful conduct
rather than risk treble damages and perhaps even criminal
penalties."
1 2'
Although Justice Scalia did not feel bound by stare decisis,
he recognized that "the common law, both in general and as em-
bodied in the Sherman Act, does not lightly assume that the ec-
onomic realities underlying earlier decisions have changed, or
that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in er-
ror.' 25 Viewing precedent as a relevant consideration, he found
no inconsistencies in the Court's prior holdings and his holding
that a vertical restraint is not illegal per se absent some agree-
ment on price or price levels.
According to Justice Scalia, Dr. Miles' per se treatment of
resale price maintenance agreements "was based largely on the
perception that such an agreement was categorically impermissi-
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121, See id. at 1521.
122. Id. at 1522 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-
63 (1984)). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
Many possible motives for a supplier to set minimum resale prices have been suggested.
See S, OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 540-44 (4th ed.
1981).
123. 108 S. Ct. at 1521-22.
124. Id. at 1521.
125. Id. at 1524.
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ble at common law . . . [as] an unlawful restraint on aliena-
tion. ' 126 Because there was no resale price agreement here, there
was no restraint on alienation, and Dr. Miles "[did] not ap-
ply."'127 The per se illegal group boycotts to eliminate price cut-
ters in General Motors and Klor's also were distinguished.
Those cases, according to Scalia, involved horizontal combina-
tions at the dealer level and at the manufacturer and wholesale
levels, respectively; Sharp involved only a vertical agreement.128
Justice Scalia also rejected the argument that vertical per se
illegal price fixing might be found without proof of an agreement
on prices on the basis of more recent Sherman Act precedents129
holding that certain horizontal agreements constituted "price
fixing" and, therefore, were per se illegal although they did not
set prices or price levels. This idea of equivalence between the
scope of horizontal and vertical per se illegality, he stated, was
"explicitly rejected" in Sylvania, "as it had to be, since a hori-
zontal agreement to divide territories is per se illegal, while GTE
Sylvania held that a vertical agreement to do so is not.'
'1 30
Finally, Justice Scalia disagreed with the argument that in
vertical price-fixing cases, Albrecht and Parke, Davis "have al-
ready rejected the proposition that per se illegality requires set-
ting a price or a price level."'' In Albrecht the combination of
the publisher, the solicitors, and delivery agents "involved both
an explicit agreement on resale price and an agreement to force
another to adhere to the specified price."' 3 2 In Parke, Davis the
manufacturer combined with wholesalers and retailers to gain
the "retailers' adherence to its suggested minimum retail
prices ' 133 and "brokered an agreement among its retailers not to
advertise prices below its suggested retail prices, which agree-
ment was held to be part of the per se illegal combination."'' 3
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1525. See also id. 1525 at n.5 (citation omitted) ("Contrary to the dis-
sent, General Motors does not differ from the present case merely in that it involved a
three-party rather than a two-party agreement. The agreement was among competitors
in General Motors; it was between noncompetitors here.").
129. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam).
130. 108 S. Ct. at 1524 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 1525.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960)).
134. Id.
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Justice Scalia denied that Parke, Davis supported a per se ille-
gal rule against a vertical restraint without a price-fixing agree-
ment, "first, because the agreement not to advertise prices was
part and parcel of the combination that contained the price
agreement, and second because the agreement among retailers
that the manufacturer organized was a horizontal conspiracy
among competitors."1
The first decision to apply Sharp, The Jeanery, Inc. v.
James Jeans, Inc.,13e followed the post-Monsanto trend, grant-
ing judgment n.o.v. to the defendant despite evidence of resale
price concerns shared by the defendant manufacturer and the
plaintiff's major competitors. Taken together, Monsanto and
Sharp - particularly as applied in lower courts - appear virtu-
ally to have eliminated the easy per se implied-conspiracy case
for terminated dealers.
V. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
Despite protestations to the contrary, when the Senate ma-
jority rejected Judge Bork, it clearly did not want a replacement
in the mold of Justice Powell, the author of both Sylvania and
Monsanto. It really wanted to change the direction the Court
had already taken and apparently hoped that Justice Powell's
replacement would be more in sync with the dissenters in
Schwinn, Justices Brennan and Marshall. Whatever position
Justice Kennedy might take, the Court is not likely to retreat to
pre-Sylvania thinking in the near future. Ironically, even Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall joined the majority in Sharp.137
This leaves legislation as the only effective means for Congress
to change the present Court's new direction. This has been done
many times before, and efforts are already underway to try
again.
135. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
136. 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67, 988 (May 2, 1988).
137. Commentators have expressed surprise that Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined the majority in Sharp because Justice Scalia's opinion "was so clear in downgrad-
ing intrabrand competition." See, e.g., Stewart & Nelson, Upholding Vertical Restraints,
A.B.A. J., July, 1988 at 36, 43 (quoting Dean Pitofsky). It should be noted, however, that
there were express agreements to assign territories and customers in Sylvania, whereas
no agreement to maintain prices was found in Sharp. There is nothing in Sharp to indi-
cate that any of the majority would uphold resale price maintenance agreements.
[Vol. 40
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On November 9, 1987, the House passed the Freedom From
Vertical Price Fixing Act of 1987.1 The bill would change Mon-
santo's standard of proof of a conspiracy necessary to withstand
a motion for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, and
to codify the per se rule against resale price maintenance. The
Senate version of this bill - The Retail Competition Enforce-
ment Act of 1987 - was approved by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on August 6, 1987.1e
138. H.R. 585, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H9796 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1987).
The Act reads:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Freedom From Vertical Price Fixing Act of
1987"
SEC. 2 EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST
ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(a) In a civil action based on a claim arising under section 1 or 3 of the
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1, 3) and alleging a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy to set, change, or maintain prices, including a minimum or maximum price,
evidence that a person who sells a good or service to the claimant for resale-
(1) received from a competitor of the claimant a communication regarding
price competition by the claimant in the resale of such good or service, and
(2) in response to such communication terminated the claimant as a buyer
of such good or service for resale, or refused to supply to the claimant some or
all of such goods or services requested by the claimant, shall be sufficient to
raise the inference that such person and such competitor engaged in concerted
action to set, change, or maintain prices, including a minimum or maximum
price, for such good or service in violation of such section. For purposes of this
subsection, a termination or a refusal to supply is in response to a communica-
tion if such communication is a substantial contributing cause of such termina-
tion or refusal to supply. Nothing herein shall preclude the court from entering
judgment in favor of the defendant, at trial or prior thereto, if the court deter-
mines on the basis of all the evidence and pleadings submitted by the parties,
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirements
of this subsection, that no such inference of concerted action can reasonably be
drawn by a trier of fact.
(b) In a civil action based on a claim arising under section 1 or 3 of the
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 1,3) and alleging a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy to set, change, or maintain prices, the fact that the seller of a good or
service and the purchaser of such good or service entered into an agreement to
establish the resale price of such good or service shall be sufficient to establish
that such seller and such purchaser engaged in concerted action to set, change,
or maintain the prices of such good or service in violation of such section.
SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY
Section 2(a) of this Act shall not apply to suits commenced under the anti-
trust laws before the date of the enactment of this Act.
139. The original Senate version of the bill was introduced by Senator Metzenbaum
of Ohio in February, 1987. See S. 430, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S1484
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In the meantime, the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has pub-
licly stated that if Congress passes this bill, he will advise the
President to veto it.140 Under the Reagan Administration, the
Department of Justice has refrained from challenging vertical
restraints, including resale price maintenance, and even filed an
amicus brief in Monsanto asking the Court to reconsider
whether resale price maintenance agreements should be per se
illegal.14 1 The Government argued that the economic effect of re-
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1987). The bill approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee made
minor changes in the original proposal. It reads as follows;
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "The
Retail Competition Enforcement Act of 1987".
Sec. 2. The Sherman Act is amended by redesignating section 8 and any
references to section 8 as section 9 and by inserting between section 7 and
section 9, as herein redesignated, the following new section:
"Sec. 8.(a) In any civil action based on section 1 or 3 of this Act, including
an action brought by the United States, or by a state attorney general, or by
the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, which alleges a contract, combination or conspiracy to set, change, or
maintain prices, if there is sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could
reasonably conclude that a person who sells a good or service to the claimant
for resale -
"(1) received from a competitor of the claimant an express or implied sug-
gestion, request, or demand, including a threat to discontinue an existing busi-
ness arrangement, that the seller take steps to curtail or eliminate price com-
petition by claimant in the resale of such good or service, and
"(2) because of such suggestion, request, demand, or threat terminated the
claimant as buyer of such good or service for resale or refused to supply to the
claimant some or all of such goods or services requested by the claimant, then
the court shall permit the trier of fact to consider whether such person and
such competitor engaged in concerted action to set, change, or maintain prices
for such good or service in violation of such section. A termination or refusal to
supply is made because of such suggestion, request, demand, or threat only if
such suggestion, request, demand or threat is a major contributing cause of
such termination or refusal to supply.
"(b) In any civil action based on section 1 or 3 of this Act, including an
action brought by the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, which alleges a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy to set, change or maintain prices, the fact that the seller of a good or ser-
vice and the purchaser of a good or service entered into an agreement to set,
change, or maintain the resale price of a good or service shall be sufficient to
constitute a violation of such section."
See S. REP. No. 280, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988).
140. Rule Criticizes RPM Bill; Promises to Recommend Veto, 53 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1341, at 784 (Nov. 19, 1987).
141. One Congressional reaction was to cut off Justice Department funds to prevent
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sale price maintenance differs little from agreements on non-
price restraints. It also is argued that the economic objection to
resale price maintenance discussed in Sylvania - that it facili-
tates horizontal cartels - easily can be met in the context of
rule-of-reason analysis. The Court declined to rule on this issue
in Monsanto because it had not been raised or argued by either
party.
If the proposed bill is enacted into law, the chief effect
would be to codify the per se illegal rule against vertical price
fixing. Assuming for the moment that vertical price fixing is
readily ascertainable conduct, this rule has the merit of absolute
simplicity. The courts would not have to anguish over econom-
ics, consumer welfare, and social or political values. Once identi-
fied as vertical price fixing, the result would be automatic. Ad-
vising clients would be equally simple. Two questions, however,
remain to be answered. First, is this good economics or good
public policy for any other reason? Second, how does one iden-
tify vertical price fixing?
Professor Bork's answer was clear: vertical price fixing not
only should be legal, but encouraged as a means of promoting
productive efficiency and consumer welfare. There is, of course,
a middle ground - namely, the rule of reason or ancillary re-
straint doctrine. Under this standard, an ancillary restraint
would be permitted when it is reasonably necessary to effectuate
a lawful main purpose. For example, assume that a newspaper
publisher desires to sell as many newspapers as possible in order
to increase advertising revenues, which are based on circulation.
Independent exclusive distributors appointed by the publisher
in each of its home-delivery territories have an interest in ex-
ploiting their territorial "monopolies" by charging a price that is
high enough to maximize their profits. The result is a conflict of
interest in resale pricing: the publisher wishes to keep prices low
to maximize circulation and advertising revenue; the distributor
it from urging the Court to overrule the per se rule against resale price maintenance.
House Judicial Committee's Report on Vertical Restraints Guidelines Resolution, H.R.
REP. No. 99-399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985), reprinted in 49 ANTITRusT 7, Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1242, at 952, 956 (Nov. 28, 1985); Departments of Commerce, Justice
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983). See also Departments of Commerce, Justice and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Appropriations Act, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 99
Stat. 1136, 1169-70 (1985).
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wishes to keep prices high to gain his "monopoly" profit. This
would be a classic case for the application of the rule of reason
to resale price maintenance. The publisher seeks to increase pro-
ductive efficiency and consumer welfare (a lawful main purpose)
by limiting the price (an ancillary restraint) that its exclusive
distributor may charge consumers in the resale of its papers.
The alternatives to vertical price fixing - such as eliminating
closed territories for distributors, raising prices to distributors,
or internally integrating the delivery function - may not be as
efficient and would injure consumers, as well as the publisher.
Therefore, there being no less-restrictive alternative, the ancil-
lary restraint should be upheld as reasonably necessary to effec-
tuate the lawful main purpose. To hold this conduct per se ille-
gal would be against economic common sense as well as
consumer welfare. Yet this is precisely what the Court did in
Albrecht142 by applying the per se rule. To codify such a rule
would take away the Court's ability to reexamine economic the-
ory and public policy to make the law grow as it has in the past
under the case-by-case application of the rule of reason. For this
reason alone, it would be regrettable for this bill to become law.
The second problem that this proposed legislation attempts
to address is that of identifying vertical price fixing. This is at-
tempted by altering the Monsanto standard for proving a com-
bination or conspiracy. It would make a dealer's demand fol-
lowed by termination of a price cutter, as in Sharp, sufficient
evidence of concerted price fixing to go to the trier of fact. If the
trier of fact finds that the surviving dealer's demand was "a ma-
jor contributing cause of such termination or refusal to sup-
ply" 143 the price cutter, then the conduct amounts to per se ille-
gal vertical price fixing. As interpreted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, "de minimis or insignificant causation would not
raise the inference under section 8(a)." '14 On the other hand,
"[iun cases where there were multiple causes for a termination or
142. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. This remains a highly disputed is-
sue. Compare Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.
1984) with USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1988).
143. S. 430, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a) (1988) (as reported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee). H.R. 585 would require a showing that "such communication is a substan-
tial contributing cause of such termination or refusal to supply." See H.R. 585, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 133 CONG. REc. H9796 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1987).
144. S. REp. No. 280, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988).
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refusal to supply[,I . . . there was general agreement that a
court need not find that the price communication was the sole,
primary, or even at least 50 percent of the cause of the termina-
tion or refusal to supply.' 45 Therefore, the Monsanto require-
ment of additional "plus factors" would still apply, albeit in a
watered-down state. A dealer termination merely following one
or more complaints alone would be insufficient to support the
adverse inference of concerted action.146 It should remain open
to the defendant to establish that the dealer termination was for
independent reasons and, though consciously parallel to the
complaining dealers' desires, was unilateral. As stated in Thea-
tre Enterprise, "'[C]onscious parallelism' has not yet read con-
spiracy out of the Sherman Act . . ".., Therefore, until Con-
gress makes it per se illegal to terminate a distributor, the trier
of fact still would have leeway to uphold unilateral terminations
of price-cutting distributors. Such discretion even would exist in
cases in which other dealers made complaints, as long as such
complaints were not a "major contributing cause" in the deci-
sion to terminate. The likely effect of shifting the burden to the
defendant to come forward with evidence of independent causa-
tion is problematic. As in the past, the result may depend upon
the attitude of the trier regarding the merits of the case. This
approach may lead to nothing more than an application of the
rule of reason sub silentio.
VI. ADVISING A CLIENT
In the current state of uncertainty and controversy, what
can a lawyer advise a client? As long as Monsanto and Sharp
remain the law, a terminated dealer plaintiff has a heavy burden
of proving either a conspiracy to terminate or a price fixing
agreement between the supplier and the surviving dealer. This
burden, however, is not impossible.
Sharp involved a termination on the insistence of a single
surviving dealer. This, in effect, was merely a case of a supplier
agreeing to appoint an exclusive distributor, a practice upheld
by the Court in the past, even before Sylvania. Under Sharp,
145. Id.
146. See supra note 41.
147. Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
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such a two-party vertical agreement would be illegal under Dr.
Miles only if it included an agreement to fix resale prices.
Viewed in this context, Sharp was not a surprising decision.
Monsanto and Sharp together are important for two reasons: (1)
an agreement with one dealer to terminate its price-cutting com-
petitor is not per se illegal, absent an agreement with the surviv-
ing dealer to fix prices, and (2) evidence that such a termination
was in response to complaints from the surviving dealer is not
sufficient, standing alone, to support a finding of a combination
or conspiracy to fix resale prices.
On the other hand, if the terminated dealer can establish a
horizontal agreement by proof beyond mere complaints by one
or more competing dealers, a trier of fact may infer an unlawful
combination or conspiracy. This was the result in Monsanto. A
horizontal-vertical conspiracy also may be found when a distrib-
utor is terminated at the insistence of several competitors acting
jointly, as in General Motors, and when a distributor is termi-
nated by two or more suppliers at the insistence of even a single
competitor, as in Klor's. Again, Monsanto is important for the
burden it places on a plaintiff to establish proof of an unlawful
agreement beyond competing dealers' complaints.
Advising a client, of course, not only requires proper inter-
pretation of the law as it stands under present statutes and deci-
sions, but also some ability to anticipate changes that may oc-
cur. Predictions being a risky business at best, cautious advisors
should take into account the worst, as well as the best, possibili-
ties. In view of the established rule that resale price mainte-
nance agreements are illegal per se, together with potential ac-
tion by Congress to codify the rule, it is unlikely that the Court
will overrule Dr. Miles. If Dr. Miles is overruled, and perhaps
even if it is not, Congress still may codify the per se rule against
vertical price fixing.
The safest advice, therefore, is to adhere to the rule of rea-
son as applied in the ancillary restraint doctrine. If a supplier-
client is contemplating termination of a dealer, counsel first
should ask why it wishes to do so. If the purpose of the termina-
tion is maintaining or enforcing a nonprice vertical restraint,
then counsel should ask whether the termination is reasonably
necessary to accomplish a procompetitive purpose, such as to
improve efficiency in distribution, and whether there is a less
restrictive alternative that reasonably would be expected to ac-
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complish the lawful main purpose. If a less restrictive alternative
exists, then take that alternative because the proposed termina-
tion may be held unreasonable under the rule of reason.
If the purpose of the termination is to eliminate a price cut-
ter, the only defense, as long as the per se rule continues to ap-
ply, is to remain outside the Sherman Act via the Colgate, Mon-
santo, or Sharp doctrines. Under Colgate, as revitalized by
Monsanto, care should be taken to enforce a preannounced pol-
icy of not dealing with price cutters by a simple refusal to deal.
To be safe, this means, among other things, that all price discus-
sions should be avoided. The policy announcement should be
general and not overemphasized or directed specifically to any
particular dealer. Complaints of price cutting, submitted by a
group of competing dealers or their representative, remain a
problem under General Motors' proscription of concerted hori-
zontal-vertical restraints. Sharp held only that the termination
of a price cutter, at the request of a single competing dealer, was
not per se illegal absent an agreement with the surviving dealer
to fix prices. Coercion by several dealers to terminate a price-
cutting competitor is a concerted horizontal restraint and re-
mains within the rule of per se illegality.
Unsolicited complaints should be answered with a letter
diplomatically, but firmly, explaining that they are not wanted,
will not be acted on, and that the supplier-client exercises sole
and exclusive judgment and control over its dealer-termination
policy. If a dealer is terminated, the termination should be ef-
fected without discussion. A real problem may arise if a termi-
nated dealer seeks reinstatement. Termination followed by rein-
statement and acquiescence may be taken as circumstantial
evidence of coercion followed by agreement to comply. In short,
discretion requires a simple refusal to deal, with no other action
that might provide something more from which a jury justifiably
might infer a combination or conspiracy to fix prices.
From the terminated dealer's point of view, an effort should
be made to document all coercion by the supplier, cooperation of
competing dealers in carrying out the supplier's plan, price dis-
cussions, and any other facts that might provide something more
than a mere termination following competitor complaints. If
concerted action is found, the crucial question is whether the
dealer termination involves a price or nonprice vertical restraint.
The terminated dealer will seek to establish that the restraint is
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price fixing, while the supplier will attempt to establish a non-
price restraint for a legitimate purpose. Considering some earlier
broad antitrust definitions of price fixing,14 8 theoretically, almost
any restraint will affect prices and, therefore, involve "price fix-
ing." Sylvania, however, makes clear that there is distinction be-
tween price and nonprice vertical restraints. The line may be
difficult to draw precisely, but it is there nonetheless.
VII. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's opinion in Sharp carries on the Chicago
School theories introduced by Justice Powell in Sylvania and
Monsanto, no doubt to the delight of former Professor and
Judge Bork, but much to the chagrin of many in Congress and
elsewhere. Although the Court has not yet reversed the per se
rule of Dr. Miles, and may never do so, it has revitalized the
Colgate doctrine and diluted some earlier theories of combina-
tion without agreement and implied conspiracy. There is now a
grey area in which a distributor may be able to eliminate price-
cutting dealers, even following complaints of competing dealers.
The main paradox, among many that perplexed Professor
Bork, is the ambivalence in prior decisions that attempted to
promote consumer welfare through encouraging ancillary re-
straints which would increase productive efficiency, while pre-
serving inefficient small businesses. The currently proposed anti-
trust amendments are not likely to promote either desiderata.
Not only are they ineffective in preventing dealer terminations
when proof of conspiracy may be in doubt, but they also will
have a dampening effect on many otherwise beneficial attempts
at vertical integration. It would be better for Congress to keep
hands off, leaving it to the Court to sort out those problems on a
case-by-case basis as it has done in the past. Professor Bork
surely was correct in his theory that if Congress leaves it to the
Court to determine what restraints are unreasonable, the Court
cannot be expected to continue to hold per se illegal that which
it finds reasonable, regardless of prior holdings or the current
view in Congress.
If Congress really wishes to protect distributors from termi-
148. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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nations by their suppliers, then it should do so in no uncertain
terms. It would be a simple drafting matter to reverse Colgate
by giving any legitimate distributor a statutory right to buy
from any supplier. The problem with this approach is the drastic
change it would work in long-standing views on economic and
civil rights. The only time a supplier may be required to sell
under the antitrust laws is when he is in a monopoly position
and no other competing products are available. The Colgate doc-
trine, itself, recognizes this limitation, as have some special legis-
lative provisions, such as environmental protection laws and pat-
ent and copyright laws, which provide for compulsory licensing
in related situations. If Congress does not like the current direc-
tion of the Court's antitrust decisions, it should decide whether
it is better to allow the Court to determine how ancillary re-
straints are to be judged under the rule of reason to promote
consumer welfare, in light of its current economic understanding
and experience, or to amend the law to protect distributors arbi-
trarily, regardless of the economic effects.14 Congress cannot
leave the burden on the Court and expect the Justices to make
value judgments contrary to their own beliefs. 150
149. Congress has taken limited steps in this direction already. See Automobile
Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C §§ 1221-1225 (1982); Petroleum Marketing Prac-
tices Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1982). Many states have enacted so-called
"good cause statutes" that limit the conditions under which franchised dealers, typically
auto or gasoline dealers, may be terminated. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-15-40(3)(c)
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
150. See R. BORK, supra note 2, at 410 ("Courts that know better ought not accept
delegations to make rules unrelated to reality and which, therefore, they know to be
utterly arbitrary. They can accept arbitrary or even pernicious rules from the
legislature.").
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